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Summary: The European Union Common Fisheries Policy has established a discard ban, which states that fish below a refer-
ence size cannot be sold directly for human consumption. In a fishing effort-regulated fishery, the discard ban can result in 
extra handling, storing and landing costs. In an output-regulated fishery, this policy might also limit the effort levels as all the 
catches count against the quota. In both cases, this regulation can reduce the economic performance of the companies, even in 
single-species fisheries. A possible solution is to increase the mesh size, thus retaining fewer small individuals. To study this 
option, a bioeconomic simulation of a change in the gear selectivity from 100- to 120-mm minimum mesh size (MMS) was 
performed. The results show that the private perspective (profits) does not change. Furthermore, due to the lower retention 
of 120 mm MMS, the efficiency of a fishing day was reduced by 5% and 2.5%, from the point of view of capital and labour 
productivity, respectively. In contrast, gross revenues increased by 1.5% and crew compensation by 2%. Given a societal 
benefit of this change in the mesh size, this gain could be re-distributed to provide an incentive for selectivity improvements.
Keywords: minimum mesh size; landing obligation; minimum conservation reference size; simulation model; selectivity; 
hake.
Evaluación bioeconómica del cambio en la selectividad de un arte de pesca: el caso de una flota mono-específica 
afectada por la obligación de desembarque
Resumen: La Política Pesquera Común de la Unión Europa ha introducido la prohibición de descartar, estableciendo que 
todo pescado por debajo de una talla de referencia no puede ser vendido para consumo humano directo. En una pesquería 
regulada a través de limitaciones del esfuerzo de pesca, la prohibición de descartar puede generar sobrecostes de manipula-
ción, almacenamiento y desembarque adicionales. En una pesquería regulada a través de límites en las capturas, esta política 
podría incluso limitar los niveles de esfuerzo ya que todas las capturas deben ser deducidas de la cuota. En ambos casos, esta 
regulación puede reducir el resultado económico de las empresas, incluso en el caso de una pesquería mono-específica. Una 
posible solución sería aumentar el tamaño mínimo de la malla, y así reducir la retención de los individuos más pequeños. 
Con el fin de estudiar esta opción, se ha realizado una simulación bioeconómica de un cambio en el tamaño mínimo de la 
malla de 100 a 120-mm. Los resultados muestran cómo la perspectiva económica privada (beneficios) no varía. Más aun, 
debido a la menor retención de la malla de 120 mm, la eficiencia de un día de pesca se ve reducida en un 5% y en un 2.5%, 
desde el punto de vista de la productividad del capital y del trabajo, respectivamente. Por el contrario, los beneficios brutos 
aumentan un 1.5% y la remuneración al trabajo en un 2%. Debido a la existencia de un beneficio social, la ganancia podría 
ser redistribuida para así ofrecer un incentivo a esta mejora de la selectividad.
Palabras clave: tamaño mínimo de la malla; obligación de desembarque, talla mínima de referencia a efectos de conser-
vación; modelo de simulación; selectividad; merluza.
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INTRODUCTION
Discards are defined as the proportion of the total 
organic material of animal origin in the catch that is 
thrown away or dumped at sea, for whatever reason 
(FAO 1996). Article 15 of the EU Common Fisher-
ies Policy (CFP) (EU 2013) bans discards, at least 
partially. This discard ban has been called the landing 
obligation (LO): within a predefined time frame, all 
the catches of stocks subject to a total allowable catch 
(TAC) regulation must be landed. Additionally, fish 
under a minimum conservation reference size (MCRS) 
cannot be used for human consumption. Such fish can 
only be sold for fish meal, pet food or other products 
not destined for direct human consumption.
The MCRS has been established as the means of 
controlling fish mortality by age group. The length of 
the fish can be used as an indirect indicator of age (Cot-
ter and Pilling 2007). The length distribution of a given 
species in the catch is related to the fishing gear and 
its technical selectivity characteristics (Hovgård and 
Lassen 2000). Catching undersized fish is the result of 
a mismatch between the selectivity of the gear and the 
MCRS and can occur even in highly species-selective 
fishing activities.
The LO is likely to have some effect on the fishing 
activity. One of its consequences is the choke species 
effect (Schrope 2010). Under LO, in a multispecies 
fishery, the TAC for one species will restrict the overall 
effort deployed by a fleet, and hence the total catches of 
other species. However, this choke effect is not unique 
to a multispecies fishery. In a single-species fishery 
managed using a TAC system, catches and landings 
should be the same. All catches, including those under 
the MCRS, count against the quota but some cannot be 
sold for direct human consumption. It implies that a 
single species can be “choked” by unfavourable length 
distribution of the catches (MCRS choke effect).
Reducing the choke effect in a single-species fish-
ery implies reducing the caches of individuals below 
the MCRS. The first objective of this study was to ex-
plore, in consultation with the skippers, the measures 
that could reduce this choke effect. Governance is key 
in fishery management, especially when a complex 
measure such as the LO is implemented. The effects 
of this measure, its implementation and its legitimacy 
affect compliance with and attainment of objectives 
(Brookhuis 2015). It is important to obtain the opin-
ions of the skippers and consider their proposals for the 
alleviation of the undesired outcomes of the LO. The 
skippers consulted put forward a potential solution: 
an increase in the MMS of the trawl cod-end. In fact, 
this is discarding mitigation practice number 5 of the 
12 described in Sigurðardóttir et al. (2015). However, 
during the consultation, the fishermen also requested 
an impact assessment of the likely consequences of 
increasing the MMS. Due to the complex, nonlinear 
nature of fishery systems, these consequences are 
not easy to evaluate. A study by Suuronen and Sardà 
(2007) reports that the biological benefits might not 
be as significant as expected, highlighting the need 
for biological assessment of the MMS change. The 
study of Suuronen and Sardà recommends a cost-
benefit analysis of any change in technical measures 
before they are implemented.
The MCRS choke effect is not the only cost that can 
be anticipated as a result of the LO. The obligation to 
retain all the catches means that the storing capacity of 
the vessel(s) must be considered. If its limit is reached 
within one trip, more trips might be required to land 
the appropriate amount of fish. Additional crew effort, 
handling and landing costs (the landings not destined 
for human consumption have to be treated in a differ-
ent manner) must also be considered. However, part 
of these costs can be recovered by selling the catch as 
non-human consumption products, such as fishmeal.
An impact assessment, the core of the rationale of 
the LO regulation, was the second objective of this 
study. The LO should, ideally, create economic incen-
tives to use the new or already available technology 
to maximize the catches that can be used for human 
consumption. This should be done by considering the 
sustainability prescription provided by the Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (MSY) objective (Article 2.2 of the 
CFP [EU 2013]).
Only a few studies analyse the cost-benefit of a se-
lectivity change (Heikinheimo et al. 2006, Macher et 
al. 2008). The published results are very case-specific, 
reinforcing the need to assess the likely effect of a 
mesh-size change case by case, as pointed out by Suu-
ronen and Sardà (2007).
In an impact assessment, the different dimensions of 
the system (economic, biological and social) cannot be 
treated in isolation. Any biological effects on, for exam-
ple, the productivity of the stock (Escapa and Prellezo 
2003, Garcia et al. 2011), will affect the economic per-
formance of the fleets (Garcia et al. 2011). Moreover, if 
economic and/or financial consequences for the compa-
nies are foreseen, this prediction might trigger a reac-
tion and hence change the catch levels and composition 
(Simons et al. 2015). This means that the simulations 
must be fully coupled and integrated; biological effects 
change the results of fishing companies, and the reaction 
of the fleets affects the dynamics of the stocks.
To perform a biological and economic impact as-
sessment of changing the mesh size, we used a bio-
economic stochastic simulation model of a hake fish-
ery in the Bay of Biscay. The simulation was based 
on an age-structured model for hake and focused on 
a single fleet targeting hake (Merluccius merluccius) 
in this area. The model produces indicators over the 
simulation period such as biomass, catches, landings, 
discards, revenues and profits. The results led to some 
interesting conclusions concerning the economic and 
social incentives for changing the mesh size.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
Overview of the pair-trawler hake-directed fishery
The Bay of Biscay (Fig. 1) is an ecosystem in which 
the fishing fleets from eight EU member states are ac-
tive (France, Spain, Germany, Denmark, United King-
dom, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal). In 2013, 
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the French and Spanish fleets accounted for 93% of the 
total catches in this area (ICES 2014).
Many extended and diverse communities of com-
mercial species can be found in the Bay of Biscay 
and surrounding waters (ICES 2014). In the demersal 
group, the most important commercial species are 
hake, megrim, anglerfish and sole. These species ac-
count for approximately 50% of the fish biomass.
Hake is important due to its abundance and eco-
nomic value. It can live for as long as 20 years and 
reach a length of 140 cm and a weight of 15 kg. It 
reaches its sexual maturity at around three to four years 
of age. It is usually found at a depth of between 75 and 
400 m. It tends to stay close to the seabed in daytime, 
leaving it to swim up the water column only at night.
There are two (management) stocks of hake in 
Atlantic EU waters. The northern stock (the stock tar-
geted by the fleet analysed) is found in the North Sea, 
Skagerrak, on the Atlantic coast of the UK and Ireland, 
and in the Bay of Biscay.
The management of hake in the Bay of Biscay is 
based on a TAC and quota system. An MCRS of 27 cm 
is in place for the Atlantic waters (30 cm for in Kattegat 
and Skagerrak the MCRS is of 30 cm and in the Medi-
terranean of 20). Hake is normally a part of a mixed 
fishery with other demersal species such as anglerfish 
and megrim and pelagic species such as mackerel and 
horse mackerel.
The Spanish bottom pair trawlers operating in the 
Bay of Biscay are an exception to this multispecies 
characteristic. In the years 2011-2013, this fleet con-
sisted of 10 vessels (5 fishing units, each consisting of 
two paired vessels) operating exclusively in the Bay of 
Biscay, with an average length of 38 m. Their average 
freezer storage capacity was 8600 (4300 per vessel) 
12-kg boxes (the characteristic box type used by this 
fleet). On average, their fishing effort was distributed 
among 50 trips (per fishing unit and year). They cap-
tured approximately 8% of the total northern stock and 
25% of hake catches in the Bay of Biscay.
The vessels in this group use a very high vertical-
opening bottom net (MMS of 100 mm) and target main-
ly hake. This species accounts for 90% of the landings 
and approximately the same proportion of income (Fig. 
2) of the bottom pair-trawler fleet. It can therefore be 
considered a single-species fleet; this means that under 
LO, the effort is not going to be limited by any other 
species. However, the effort constraint might arise from 
the fact that approximately 5% of the catches of hake 
(in weight) are individuals under the MCRS. In the past, 
the fish smaller than the MCRS were discarded. Further-
more, according to Rochet et al. (2014), 99% of hake 
discards consist of individuals under the MCRS. Under 
the provisions of the LO, from 2016 onwards, such fish 
must be landed and counted against the quota.
Selectivity calculations
Before assessing the impact of a change in the 
MMS, the extent of the size change must be chosen. 
The five skippers who took part in the survey requested 
that the MMS be increased from 100 to 120 mm.
It should also be noted that this selectivity level 
is specific for hake, and the changes do not affect the 
catches of other species. This might be a problematic 
assumption in the multispecies fisheries, but the fleet 
analysed here targets only hake, so; this assumption 
should not significantly affect the results.
To simulate the selectivity change, it was consid-
ered that the catchability (q) can be decomposed into a 
product of the selectivity of the gear used and a param-
eter that incorporates the vulnerability, accessibility 
and availability of the fish, as described in the paper of 
Arreguín-Sánchez (1996). Mathematically,
Fig. 1. – Case study area: Bay of Biscay (shaded area). 
Fig. 2. – Landings (left) and income (right) composition for pair 
trawlers. Average for 2011-2013. 
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 qa,ms=Sa,ms ra , (1)
where Sa,m,s stands for the selectivity of fish of age a re-
lated to the MMS; ms and ra stand for the factors affect-
ing catchability and are not related to the MMS. If the 
catchability and selectivity at age a for a given MMS 
are known, ra can be calculated by applying Equation 
1. It can be used afterwards to estimate the hypothetical 
catchability for the MMS, for which age selectivity is 
known.
Selectivity of the fish length for pair trawlers with 
100-mm MMS has been estimated by The Spanish 
Oceanography Institute (IEO 2006). In the same study, 
the selectivity of 80-mm MMS was also provided. A 
logistic selection curve (Eq. 2) was fitted to the results 
for the 100-mm MMS.
 r(L)=exp(a+bL)/ (1+ exp(a+bL)) , (2)
where a and b are the parameters to be estimated. The 
results of the estimation were a=–6.53 and b=0.2. This 
curve has the property that the length for 50% retention 
r(L50) is such that r(L50)=0.5 and therefore L50 =–a/b.
However, there are no studies providing the length 
selectivity for hake for pair trawlers with 120-mm 
MMS. Furthermore, several factors affect the size se-
lection of the towed fishing gears for a given mesh size. 
These are the spatial and seasonal variations (Ozbilgin 
and Wardle 2002), gear design, netting materials and 
twine diameters (Herrmann 2005). Vessel-level factors 
also affect the cod-end selectivity (Tschernij and Holst 
1999). All these factors explain the large variability in 
the results of size selection experiments with towed 
fishing gears.
To overcome these difficulties, the percentage 
change in L50 between 80- and 100-mm MMS was 
calculated. It was used as a proxy of the L50, keeping 
the shape of the curve (parameter b of Eq. 2) constant.
The results showed that the L50 was 22.6 cm with 
an 80-mm MMS 34.6 cm with a 100-mm MMS. Con-
sequently, it could be inferred that the L50 for a 120-
mm MMS was 40.8 cm. This last value was within the 
range of the expected L50 (from 22 to 43 cm, according 
to ICES [2015]).
To fit the results into the age-structured dynam-
ics of the simulation model, the selectivity-at-length 
curves were transformed to age using the Von Berta-
lanffy growth model (the Stock Synthesis III assess-
ment model; Methot and Wetzel 2013) employed by 
the ICES assessment working group for hake (ICES 
2014). The results of applying this procedure are pre-
sented in Figure 3.
The simulation model
A model coupled in all its dimensions (economic, 
biological and social) is required to perform the im-
pact assessment of the change in the MMS. Economic 
results are related to the stock productivity, which can 
change depending on the retention pattern. Moreover, 
the stock productivity is also related to fishing effort. 
For example, if one fleet stops fishing, the overall pro-
ductivity of the stock will change, simply because of 
the average selectivity changes.
The model used was FLBEIA (Garcia et al. 2013, 
Prellezo et al. 2016), developed in R (R Core Team 
2014). The model projects several fleets and the likely 
effects on stock dynamics under different management 
scenarios.
Economic conditioning and model
Pair trawlers were economically conditioned using 
AZTI data sources obtained through the Data Collec-
tion Framework of the EU (EC 2008). The data com-
bine information from log sheets, discard sampling, 
landing declarations and sale notes (the time series 
from 2009 to 2013). The cost data of fishing vessels 
were obtained from the Annual Economic Report on 
the EU Fishing Fleet (STECF 2014). To adapt these 
values to the specific conditioning of the case study, 
the economic figures were weighted by the proportion 
of pair-trawler vessels and converted into weighted av-
erages for the fleet. The exact values obtained and used 
in the simulation are reported in Table 1.
Several types of costs were defined: those changing 
with the effort (variable and fuel costs), those chang-
ing with the value of landings (crew costs); and those 
changing with the number of vessels (fixed, capital and 
depreciation costs). There are also other costs associat-
ed with the LO. Under this regulation, each trip retains 
more fish than without LO. Therefore, more storage 
boxes might be required, and the refrigeration facilities 
of the vessels must be suitable for storing them.
The storage requirements per trip were calculated 
for boxes of 12 kg. If the maximum number of boxes 
that can be stored in a fishing unit is higher than the 
needs, the additional costs will be zero. If not, the addi-
tional trips must be evaluated at a variable cost (chang-
ing with the effort, if more trips can be made to catch 
Fig. 3. – Selectivity curves for the pair trawlers using a 100-mm and 
120-mm MMS. 
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the same amount) or at the market price if the catch is 
smaller (more trips cannot be made due to a physical 
limit).
All fleets that cause hake fishing mortality were 
included in the model. For the projection, the fleet 
fishing effort was kept constant, except for the Span-
ish pair trawlers operating in the Bay of Biscay, as 
explained below.
The relationship between the hake population and 
the catch was analysed in biomass. The catch and effort 
relationship was based on a Schaefer production model 
(Schaefer 1954) at the age level.
 ha=qaEXa (3)
Equation 3 describes the catch of hake (h) at age (a) 
as a function of its catchability coefficient (q), which 
was also calculated at the age level, the biomass of hake 
(X) at the age level and the effort exercised by the fleet 
on fishing days (E). Throughout the projection, the pair-
trawler effort was limited by the TAC share of hake. This 
share was calculated (based on the average for 2011-
2013) as approximately 8%, as mentioned previously. It 
was assumed that the remaining hake was caught by the 
“other” fleets, according to their catch share.
Hake ex-vessel prices were obtained from the sale 
sheets of the fleet using averages from 2009 to 2013 
(Table 2) with a coverage of 100%. The commercial 
categories were converted into ages on the basis of ex-
pert knowledge. The price–age structure follows a “U” 
shape: “small” individuals (under the age of 3 or 67 cm 
long) and “big” individuals (over the age of 4 or 75 cm 
long) have higher prices than medium-sized individu-
als. This result was validated in the interviews with the 
skippers. They argued that the higher prices for small 
and large individuals were due to market preferences. 
For the projection, the prices by age were considered 
constant, although the average price could change 
due to the different size compositions of the landings. 
This is a reasonable assumption, given that the stock is 
currently close to the FMSY (the fishing mortality con-
sistent with achieving MSY). This implies that for the 
Harvest Control Rule (HCR) used, no big changes in 
TAC are expected. However, it should be considered 
that the prices used in the simulation could not clear the 
market. Finally, for the “other” stock, an average price 
was calculated (Table 2).
Biological conditioning and model
The simulation used age-structured dynamics, and 
the data necessary to condition the model were taken 
from the ICES assessment working group report and 
from the results of the assessment modelling conducted 
by this group (ICES 2014). The stock-recruitment (S/R) 
relationship used was a Bayesian segmented regression 
(Butterworth and Bergh 1993). The selection was kept 
consistent with the methodology used by ICES to esti-
mate the reference points of this stock (ICES 2014). The 
population was projected by combining this S/R with an 
exponential survival equation (Quinn and Deriso 1989).
Stochasticity was only introduced in the S/R of 
hake. A lognormal multiplicative error around the S/R 
curve (with a median equal to one and a coefficient of 
variation equal to the one observed in the historical pe-
riod) was used. Two hundred and fifty iterations were 
run. No more uncertainties were considered.
Management conditioning and model
The reference point for hake was FMSY, which in 
the case of hake is 0.27 (ICES 2014). The TAC advice 
was generated using the HCR provided by ICES in 
the framework of the MSY (ICES 2012). This HCR 
is based on three reference points: FMSY (as explained 
before), the Btrigger (the biomass that triggers a spe-
cific stock recovery action) set at 46000 t, and Blim (the 
level of spawning stock biomass, SSB, below which 
the recruitment might be impaired) set at 33000 t. The 
HCR advises FMSY unless the SSB falls below Btrigger 
but remains above Blim. If SSB falls below Btrigger, the 
fishing mortality advised is reduced in such a way that 
the biomass recovers the Btrigger level. Finally, if the 
biomass falls below Blim, the TAC advised will be zero.
The “other” stock accounts for the catches of spe-
cies different from hake. These catches were consid-
ered proportional to the effort deployed (using Eq. 
3) by the fleet, assuming an arbitrary “large” added 
biomass. This assumption was expected to have a low 
impact on the results, given that hake constitutes 90% 
of the catch of this fleet.
Perfect implementation of the management ad-
vice was assumed. In the projection the LO started 
in the year 2016, and no exemptions to this LO were 
introduced.
Table 1. – Cost data of the Spanish pair trawlers: average. Data source: AER (2014).
Variable Pair trawlers Units Variable Pair trawlers Units
Fuel Cost 1240 €/days Capital Cost 64438 €/vessel/year
Crew Cost 33% % of the fishing income Depreciation 20952 €/vessel/year
Variable Cost 875 €/days Max. days 150 days
Fixed Cost 15449 €/vessel/year Employment (full-time equivalent) 11 per vessel
Table 2. - Hake average ex-vessel prices for the Spanish trawling fleet (2009-2013). Data source: AZTI database.
Code Common name Scientific name Stock Age Average price 
HKE Hake Merluccius merluccius VI, VII, VIIIabd <3 €2.27
HKE Hake Merluccius merluccius VI, VII, VIIIabd 3 €2.16
HKE Hake Merluccius merluccius VI, VII, VIIIabd 4 €2.07
HKE Hake Merluccius merluccius VI, VII, VIIIabd >4 €2.89
OTH Others Others - all €1.96
376 • R. Prellezo et al.
SCI. MAR. 81(3), September 2017, 371-380. ISSN-L 0214-8358 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/scimar.04597.18A
RESULTS
Changes in the productivity of the stock
Selectivity changes are likely to alter the produc-
tivity of the stock. Even if the removal quantities are 
similar, their different age compositions could change 
the age distribution in the stock. In particular, young 
individuals tend to have higher growth rates (Mellon-
Duval et al. 2010). Thus, if the average retention size is 
increased, the productivity of the stock is likely to rise. 
This hypothesis was tested in the simulation.
Figure 4A shows no differences in the evolution of 
the stock for the MMS of 100 and 120 mm. This is 
because the selectivity change only affects 8% of the 
hake catches. Thus, the increase in the MMS from 100 
to 120 mm did not have a significant impact on the 
stock biotic potential.
Changes in catches and landings of hake
Though the evolution of SSB and fishing mortality 
did not change during the simulation (Fig. 4B), there 
were some changes in total catches of hake and in the 
size distribution of these catches (Fig. 5B, C).
In this fleet, the necessary effort to catch its share of 
hake (i.e. the quota) was not constrained by the capac-
ity. As a result of the obligation to retain all the catches, 
extra storage was required (10% increase in the number 
of boxes). During an average trip, these fishing units 
catch approximately 30 t of fish (2500 boxes), with a 
maximum of 59 t (4900 boxes). The refrigeration ca-
pacity of one vessel is around 50 t (4000 boxes); the 
fishing unit has a refrigeration capacity of 100 t. This 
shows that the refrigeration storage capacity (meeting 
the safety requirements) does not limit the fishing ef-
fort within one trip.
Thus, the number of trips required to catch the TAC 
share were the same for 100- and 120-mm MMS. It 
also meant that the overall catches of hake were the 
same for these two mesh sizes (Fig. 5A). However, 
there was a difference between size compositions of 
the catches. The 120-mm MMS gear produced smaller 
catches of individuals below the MCRS (Fig. 5C). 
For the overall simulation period (2016–2020), these 
Fig. 4. – Spawning Stock Biomass (SSB) and Fishing mortality (F) 
evolution under the two different MMS scenarios for pair trawlers. 
The lines represent the medians. Ninety percent of the iterations fall 
within the shaded areas. The limits of the shaded areas represent the 
5% and 95% confidence intervals. 
Fig. 5. – Total hake catches, their size distribution (over or under the MCRS) and their market value for pair trawlers under the two MMS 
scenarios. The lines represent the medians. Ninety percent of the iterations fall within the shaded areas. The limits of the shaded areas represent 
the 5% and 95% confidence intervals. 
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catches were reduced by 37%. Figure 5C shows that 
the landings of hake that could be sold for direct hu-
man consumption increased by 1.4% when 120-mm 
MMS were used compared with the 100-mm MMS. 
Furthermore, as the size structure of these landings was 
affected, the average price for 120-mm MMS catches 
was 0.5% higher than the price of catches conducted 
using 100-mm MMS gear. The use of 120-mm MMS 
raised the gross revenues (ex-vessel prices multiplied 
by the landings) by 2% (Fig. 5D).
However, fishing with 120-mm MMS nets required 
an increased level of effort (Fig. 6) because of the 
lower overall retention of the net. To obtain catches of 
similar size to those of 100-mm MMS, the effort had to 
be increased on average by 4.5% (for the same number 
of vessels for the period 2016–2020).
Changes in the financial performance of the fleet
Figure 5A shows that the catches of hake are the 
same for the two MMSs. The landings of hake destined 
for human consumption are higher for 120- than for 
100-mm MMS (Fig. 5B). Therefore, the gross revenues 
will also be higher. However, as can be seen in Figure 
6, this result is obtained at the cost of an increased fish-
ing effort, which implies an increase in variable costs. 
To determine which of these two factors has a stronger 
effect, two economic indicators were used: gross value 
added (GVA) and gross profit. GVA quantifies the 
value that a fishery is adding to the economy. It is com-
prised of the compensations received by the crew and 
by the capital (gross profit). The results for these two 
indicators are presented in Figure 7A and B.
The simulations showed that GVA was larger for 
120-mm MMS than for 100-mm MMS. This causes an 
increase in the gross revenue, which is higher for 120-
mm MMS net use (Fig. 5D). However, variable costs of 
the effort required to obtain these landings (crew costs, 
fuel costs and other variables costs, Table 1) were also 
higher for the larger MMS. The overall result shows 
that the increase in revenue is sufficient to compensate 
for the extra costs, generating an overall increase in the 
GVA of 1.5% per year. The crew compensation will 
also increase because they receive a percentage of the 
gross revenue. Overall, the use of 120-mm MMS re-
sulted in a crew share increase of 2% per year.
Fig. 6. – Fishing effort (fishing days) for pair trawlers under the two 
MMS scenarios. The lines represent the medians. Ninety percent of 
the iterations fall within the shaded areas. The limits of the shaded 
areas represent the 5% and 95% confidence intervals.
Fig. 7. – Profit, gross value added (GVA), capital productivity and labour productivity of pair trawlers under the two MMS scenarios. The 
lines represent the medians. Ninety percent of the iterations fall within the shaded areas. The limits of the shaded areas represent the 5% and 
95% confidence intervals.
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The other component of GVA is the capital com-
pensation, which can be illustrated using profit as an 
indicator. Profit does not change when the 120-mm 
MMS is used (Fig. 7A), because a third of the extra 
gross revenue goes, through the crew share, to the crew. 
Thus, from the point of view of the capital owner, it is 
not worth increasing the MMS, or at least there are no 
financial incentives for this change.
The productivity of fishing effort should also be 
considered. Capital productivity, measured in terms of 
the gross profit per fishing day, was 5% lower for 120-
mm MMS than for 100-mm MMS (Fig. 7C). Crew pro-
ductivity (crew compensation per fishing day) was also 
lower (2.5%) for the larger MMS (Fig. 7D). Though 
the total crew compensation is higher when using this 
MMS, it is obtained by increasing the number of fish-
ing days, with a reduced compensation per day.
In summary, the results show that increasing the 
MMS from 100 to 120 mm does not change the stock 
biotic potential, at least when this increase is imple-
mented in the fleet studied. However, the productivity 
of the effort is reduced, in terms of both catches per 
unit of effort and the GVA and profit per unit of ef-
fort. The total capital compensation was unchanged, 
so there were no private economic incentives to imple-
ment the MMS change. The MMS increase produced 
more hake landings above MCRS and higher average 
ex-vessel prices of hake, which created an increase in 
revenues and GVA.
DISCUSSION
Consultation with skippers
As pointed out by Graham et al. (2007), a gear de-
sign solution might be more acceptable to fishers than a 
spatial or temporal closure. The answers obtained from 
the interviews with the skippers are in agreement with 
this notion. The MMS increase, as a way to improve 
the selectivity of the fishing gear, is a measure that 
can be implemented when the choke effect is caused 
by the size composition and not by the species con-
flict. However, increasing the selectivity of the gear is 
not straightforward. For example, in the same fishing 
area, the inclusion of a top square mesh panel has not 
produced significant changes in the size composition 
of the catches (Alzorriz et al. 2016). Furthermore, the 
results from the simulation show no capital-based in-
centives to increase the MMS.
Biotic potential
Before an economic impact assessment, an evalua-
tion of the effects of a change in selectivity on the biotic 
potential of the stock should be conducted. This evalua-
tion should be integrated and coupled with the economic 
analysis. The result of the simulation presented here 
shows that, from the fishery community point of view, 
there would be no evolutionary change due to the new 
selection pattern. The study of Hilborn and Minte-Vera 
(Hilborn and Minte-Vera 2008) shows that selectivity 
is not the main aspect of the growth of the stocks. The 
results of the current simulation confirmed this observa-
tion; however, it must be taken into account that only 
8% of the fishing mortality was considered.
The simulation did not deal with the impact on the 
ecosystem. Gear-related conservation measures as-
sume that the escaping fish survive and support the 
relevant population. However, there are no reliable 
estimates of post-capture survival of hake (Suuronen 
and Sardà 2007). The overall impact on the ecosys-
tem is not easy to anticipate. Neither the changes in 
the ecosystem productivity (Sardà et al. 2015) nor 
the effects of these changes on the fleet productivity 
(Garcia et al. 2011, 2012) predict ecological perturba-
tions in a precise way. Further research in this field is 
urgently needed.
Fishing effort
In the analysed fleet, an increase in MMS reduced 
the efficiency of the system (in terms of catch per unit of 
effort). The desired effect of the regulation is to change 
the size distribution by reducing the catches of indi-
viduals under MCRS. This change should also increase 
the average price. This was, indeed, the case in our 
simulation, although this result was the consequence of 
the change in the MMS and not its cause (Asche et al. 
2015). Nevertheless, this result might create an incen-
tive for using gears with increased selectivity.
In the simulation presented here, a rise in selectiv-
ity implies a lower retention of individuals below the 
MCRS of hake. The overall effect is that more of the 
landings are destined for human consumption but at the 
cost of increased fishing effort. When more effort is 
exerted, two possible limits have to be considered. The 
first limit is a capacity ceiling (no more fishing days 
are available, or no more vessels can be made). We 
did not observe this problem in the current simulation. 
The second potential limit is associated with the spe-
cies caught, of which some might be constrained by 
the LO. In the case analysed, the fleet is “almost” a 
single-species fleet, so such situation is unlikely. The 
results show that the fleet using an increased-MMS 
gear needs more effort to catch their hake quota. No 
onboard storage limits were observed. However, the 
storage problems might occur in different fleets, and 
an increase in the number of trips might be necessary to 
land the same amount of fish for human consumption.
Economic and financial results of the fishing firms
The observed 2% increase in gross revenues clearly 
differs from the predicted general 10% to 15% reduc-
tion (Villasante et al. 2016). This discrepancy can be 
explained by the single-species character of the ana-
lysed fleet. However, we also observed an increase in 
the required fishing effort and, hence, a rise in the vari-
able costs. Overall, the private financial results (profits 
of the capital owner) are not improved by using a larger 
MMS. This result has been anticipated by Skonhoft et 
al. (2012), whose study concludes that a policy enforc-
ing a more selective fishing gear can either reduce or 
increase the total profitability of the fishery.
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The productivity of the effort was reduced by em-
ploying the larger MMS nets. This was true from the 
point of view of both the capital owner (profit) and 
the labour force (crew compensation). Furthermore, 
this result was independent of the investment required 
to change the MMS and/or the time to amortize this 
investment. Thus, it seems that there are no private 
incentives to use the more selective fishing gear. 
However, some costs associated with the LO were not 
considered in the simulation. For example, additional 
landing costs might be incurred by buying the boxes 
necessary to store the extra fish or the cost of ice to 
keep the catch fresh. This might be compensated by the 
extra income from selling the catch under the MCRS. 
A commercial fishmeal plant was consulted and cited 
the average price of between 50 and 120 €/t, depending 
on the fish quality (freshness and oil percentage of the 
raw material). At this price level, approximately 10% 
of the extra landing costs could be covered. Even if this 
conclusion might be somewhat speculative, it seems 
that the additional landing costs observed might result 
in an underestimate of the perceived private incentives 
for changing the MMS. Further research is required to 
analyse this issue.
Finally, the results showed that the GVA and human 
consumption hake supply increased after the enlarge-
ment of the gear MMS. This means that society has the 
potential capacity to compensate the productivity loss 
of the owners of the labour and the capital.
CONCLUSIONS
Here, we performed a bioeconomic impact assess-
ment of an MMS increase for a case study in the Atlan-
tic Area. It should be noted, however, that the MCRS 
regulations will have a more global effect in other EU 
areas such as the Mediterranean, where the TAC is 
not used as a general fishery management instrument, 
and the MCRS is the main component of the LO. The 
simulation showed no private incentives for increasing 
the MMS. However, this conclusion cannot necessarily 
be extrapolated to other areas or to other fleets. Other 
case-specific studies must be conducted to reach a de-
tailed understanding of the subject. The lack of private 
incentives should not discourage society from support-
ing the increase in the selective fishing activities. From 
the social perspective, there is room for incentives 
that increase the selectivity of the gear, at least in the 
fleet analysed here. These incentives can be created by 
penalizing the lower selectivity of the 100-mm MMS 
or rewarding (for example, with a higher quota or ef-
fort possibilities) the use of a more selective gear. One 
such example is the bonus provided to some vessels in 
the fully documented fishery trials of Danish fisheries 
(Kindt-Larsen et al. 2011).
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